Representations and Warranties:  Why They Did Not Stop the Crisis by McCoy, Patricia A. & Wachter, Susan
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
6-2-2016
Representations and Warranties: Why They Did
Not Stop the Crisis
Patricia A. McCoy
Boston College Law School, patricia.mccoy@bc.edu
Susan Wachter
University of Pennsylvania, wachter@wharton.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Banking and Finance Law Commons, Property Law
and Real Estate Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Patricia A. McCoy and Susan Wachter. "Representations and Warranties: Why They Did Not Stop the Crisis." Evidence and Innovation
in Housing Law and Policy, Forthcoming 2017 (2016).



 
 
4 
 
contraction of credit by bank lenders and the concomitant surge in market share by more lightly 
regulated nonbank lenders, and propose reforms.  In particular, we contend that representations 
and warranties will not have teeth unless they are accompanied by countercyclical provisioning 
and capital standards.  Part IV concludes. 
 
II. Historical Background and Overview of Recent Mortgage Put-back Liability 
 
The current controversy over mortgage put-backs emanates from the shift of U.S. housing 
finance from a bank-based system to a capital markets system over the past fifty years.  Fifty 
years ago, mortgage originators usually held loans in portfolio.  But that all changed in the 1970s 
with the invention of MBS,4 which gave mortgage lenders the ability to move newly originated 
mortgages off their balance sheets by bundling those loans into bonds sold to private investors.   
Over time, securitization became the predominant means of mortgage finance and three 
securitization channels emerged:  Ginnie Mae for FHA-insured and VA mortgages, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac for other conforming mortgages (also known as agency mortgages), and the 
private-label (Wall Street) market for non-conforming mortgages (most notably jumbo loans and 
subprime and Alt-A mortgages).5  Securitization offers benefits to depository institutions by 
solving the term-mismatch problem arising because bank liabilities (in the form of demand 
deposits) are considerably more liquid than their long-term mortgage assets (Diamond 2007).   
A. The Growth of Mortgage Securitization 
The secondary market in the U.S., established after the Great Depression, was small, 
relative to the overall mortgage market until the 1980s.  Originators, mostly S&Ls, held 
mortgages in portfolio, other than government-insured FHA/VA mortgages.  In the aftermath of 
the S&L crisis, Ginnie Mae and the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Fannie and 
Freddie, grew rapidly as funding sources (Levitin and Wachter 2013, 1165-67). 
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Starting in the late 1990s and accelerating between 2003 to 2007, regulatory shifts  
(McCoy et al. 2009) and changes to the structure of the mortgage chain led to the onset of a 
secondary mortgage lending regime dominated by private-label securitization and mediated by 
Wall Street investment banks (Levitin and Wachter 2012; Wachter, 2014).  A substantial 
expansion of credit followed.  The number of purchase mortgages originated increased from 4.3 
million to 5.7 million and remained above 5.5 million through 2006 (FFIEC 2015).  Private-label 
securities (PLS) had originally funded jumbo mortgages whose size precluded their inclusion in 
GSE securitizations. The PLS lending of 2003 through 2007 funded non-traditional mortgage 
(NTM) products and subprime loans. Prior to the PLS boom, most mortgages were, conforming, 
self-amortizing 30-year fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs).  However, during the boom, there was a 
substantial increase in non-traditional mortgages, including non-amortizing (or negative 
amortization) balloon, interest-only (IO), and option-payment mortgage products, as well as 
subprime loans and other Alt-A products (which did not require full documentation of income). 
The share of NTMs (including second-lien mortgages) rose from twenty percent in 2003 to fifty 
percent in 2006.  (Figure 1). There was a simultaneous change in the types of products sold in the 
secondary market and a shift to private-label securitization.   
While most conforming mortgages were securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
most NTMs and subprime loans were securitized in the PLS market. Figures 1 and 2 (which 
disaggregates mortgages by type) show the share of PLS and NTM and subprime mortgage 
issuance peaking during 2006 and almost disappearing after 2008. While the PLS market share 
rose during the housing boom, the GSE (conventional, conforming) and Ginnie Mae markets 
shares shrunk (Wachter 2014). 
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Fig. 1: Market share of non-traditional mortgage products and private label securitization 
 
Fig. 2: Origination shares by mortgage type, 2000–2012 
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A. Principal-Agent Problems in Securitization 
Securitization ushered in new principal-agent problems that the inventors of MBS 
worked to address.  Adverse selection was one issue, consisting of the fear that originators would 
retain their best loans and securitize the rest.  Investors were also concerned about information 
asymmetries, because lenders know more about the quality of the loans they originate than 
investors and have incentives to conceal negative information when selling those loans.6   
Private capital would shun the mortgage finance system absent assurances to investors on 
both scores.  Consequently, securitizers used a host of techniques to address the principal-agent 
problems in securitization, including disclosures, underwriting standards, quality control, due 
diligence reviews, and risk retention.  Key among those techniques was representations and 
warranties, the focus of this chapter. 
B. The Use of Representations and Warranties in MBS 
Every mortgage-backed securitization starts out with the sale of a pool of mortgage loans 
by a seller to a purchaser.  The purchaser is generally a GSE, an FHA/VA securitization issuer, 
or an investment bank that plans to transfer the loans to a special purpose vehicle for bundling 
into MBS for sale to investors.  Often the seller is the originator, but it can also be a large bank 
that aggregates loans bought from a third-party originator.  In the course of the series of transfers 
that make up a securitization, many of the transferors make representations and warranties to the 
next transferee down the chain (Murphy 2012).   
The central contract governing the loan sale is a Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement 
between the seller and the purchaser (Miller 2014, 259, 267).  This agreement or its equivalents 
are found in all three major securitization channels, including Ginnie Mae, the GSEs and private-
label securitizations (FHFA 2012, 6, 10-12). The typical Agreement contains over fifty 
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crisis, if the substance of any representation and warranty was inaccurate and the inaccuracy 
materially and adversely affected the value of the mortgage loan in question or the interest of the 
purchaser, then the representation and warranty was breached, even if the seller was unaware and 
could not have been aware of the inaccuracy when the representation was made (see, e.g., Master 
Loan Purchase Agreement 2005, § 6).  The Agreements go on to state that following prompt 
written notice of the discovery of such an inaccuracy, the seller shall use its best efforts to 
promptly cure the breach within ninety days.  If the breach cannot be cured, then the seller, at the 
purchaser’s option, shall repurchase the mortgage loan at issue at the purchase price8 (see, e.g., 
id., § 6).  Effectively, this gives the purchaser a put option for loans that violate representations 
and warranties. 
In theory, this put option is quite strong.  This remedy is not technically conditioned on a 
realized loss to the investor; instead, it can apply so long as a breach results in a material paper 
loss to the mortgage loan in question.  As a practical matter, however, operationally relatively 
“small” errors in representations would not in general lead to exercise of the put option prior to 
default.  In default such errors become salient.   And in the crisis the decline in real estate prices 
made such ordinarily ignored errors particularly salient as prices and collateral declined 
dramatically. 
At the same time, the contractual remedy for breach of representations and warranties is 
only as good as a seller’s solvency.  For the put option to have bite, a seller must still be 
operating and have sufficient assets to pay a judgment.   This became a particular concern in the 
case of breaches by nonbank lenders, over one hundred of whom operated with razor-thin 
margins and capsized after they lost their funding in 2007.9 
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D. The Mortgage Crisis 
 
Had investors given representations and warranties scant credence when they originally 
bought loans, those provisions might not have mattered.  However, investors took reps and 
warranties seriously.  The rating agencies, for instance, touted their review of the reps and 
warranties for every private-label deal in order to give investors confidence that their ratings had 
integrity (see, e.g., S&P Global Ratings 2004).  After the crisis, the Basel Committee and 
government investigators concluded that investors had placed undue faith in the efficacy of reps 
and warranties (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2011; Ergungor 2008). 
To investors’ chagrin, those representations and warranties failed to prevent the spike in 
mortgage loan defaults that culminated in the 2008 financial crisis.  As discussed above, by the 
early 2000s, private-label securitization had outgrown its traditional function of funding jumbo 
conforming loans to also financing increasing numbers of nontraditional mortgage products.  
From 2004 through 2007, investors flocked to subprime and Alt-A MBS because of their higher 
yields (McCoy et al. 2009, 496-97 & fig. 1).  Originators met the demand for higher coupon 
mortgages with risky interest-only and pay-option mortgages with no or negative amortization, 
which together reached an astonishing fifty percent of all mortgage originations in spring 2005 
(id., 497 fig. 1).  A series of decisions by federal banking regulators to deregulate residential 
mortgages also helped pave the way for this unprecedented growth (McCoy and Engel 2011, 
151-205). 
During the run-up to the crisis, the proliferation of subprime and Alt-A loans was 
accompanied by a marked deterioration in loan underwriting standards.  Between 2002 and 2006, 
two of the strongest predictors of default rose noticeably:  loan-to-value ratios and the proportion 
of loans with combined loan-to-value ratios of over eighty percent (Levitin and Wachter 2015).  
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Meanwhile, lenders increasingly layered one risk on top of another, often combining low-equity, 
no-amortization loans with reduced documentation underwriting (McCoy et al. 2009, 504-05 & 
fig. 3).  Loan fraud also became more prevalent during this period, with private-label securitized 
mortgages and low-documentation mortgages experiencing particularly high levels of fraud 
(Mian and Sufi 2015).  Loan origination volume shifted to lenders who used private-label 
securitization with lower and less well enforced underwriting standards, although there is 
evidence that there was somewhat of a decline in the GSE underwriting standards as well 
(Wachter 2014; Wachter 2016).  Under pressure to maintain market share, other lenders cast 
aside their reputational concerns and lowered their lending standards in response (Engel and 
McCoy 2011, 38-40). 
As the ensuing disaster unfolded, it soon became apparent that representations and 
warranties had not prevented the sharp deterioration in underwriting standards during the credit 
bubble.  Increasingly, it became apparent that loan features and performance that were in direct 
breach of the representations and warranties – including excessive loan-to-value ratios, early 
payment defaults, and outright fraud – had become commonplace.  The first warning signs of 
higher defaults appeared in subprime and Alt-A adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) beginning in 
mid-2005 and worsened after that (see Figure 3).  As defaults mounted in 2006, the number of 
mortgage repurchase requests remained modest but started to increase in response10 (Sabry and 
Schopflocher 2007).  According to Fitch Ratings, early payment defaults were the “root cause” 
of these early repurchase requests, particularly in loans with layered risks such as lower credit 
scores, second-liens and stated income underwriting (Fitch 2006). 
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Fig. 3.  Percentage of Subprime and Alt-A ARMs Ninety Days or More Past Due or In 
Foreclosure 
 
Reporting Period Subprime ARMs Alt-A ARMs 
July 2005 5.63% 0.43% 
July 2006 8.16% 0.74% 
July 2007 14.63% 3.06% 
December 2007 20% 6% 
 
Source:  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Table Data for Mortgage 
Delinquency Rates, 2001-07; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monetary 
Report to Congress 6 (2008). 
 
Through 2006, rising housing values allowed troubled borrowers to refinance their 
mortgages in order to avoid default.  In the first quarter of 2007, however, housing prices began 
to slide nationwide for the first time since the Great Depression and the foreclosure crisis began 
in earnest.  During this period, the compensatory and deterrent functions of representations and 
warranties were seriously tested. 
E. Repurchase Demands and Actions to Enforce Put-back Clauses 
 
As falling home prices impeded the ability of distressed borrowers to avoid default by 
refinancing their loans or selling their homes, mortgage delinquencies skyrocketed (see Figure 3) 
and mortgage put-back requests surged (Hartman-Glaser et al. 2014, 28 fig. 3).  Data on 
aggregate recoveries for all put-back demands are hard to come by.  But we can get a sense of 
the magnitude by examining put-back collections by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
The two GSEs sought recourse for bad loans for two lines of business activities.  First, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac lodged repurchase claims against originators or aggregators for 
defective loans that had been sold to them.  While the evidence is incomplete, the percentage of 
loans subject to Fannie/Freddie buyback claims seems to have been modest (less than two 
percent of balances at origination for GSE thirty-year, fixed-rate full-documentation, fully 
amortizing loans from select deals) (Goodman and Zhu 2013; Goodman et al. 2015, 3-5 & fig. 
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1).  From January 1, 2009 through the third quarter of 2015, as a result of those claims, Fannie 
and Freddie collected a total of $76.1 billion from over 3,000 companies for loans repurchased 
from their mortgage-backed securitization trusts (GSE Repurchase Activity).  This more than 
doubled the total industry liability that Standard & Poor’s had originally estimated for GSE 
repurchase and securitization claims in 2011 (Murphy 2012).  Not all of the GSEs’ put-back 
claims were successful, however, and the two enterprises ultimately withdrew or stopped 
pursuing another $61.9 billion in repurchase demands (GSE Repurchase Activity).  For the put-
back claims that settled, the average payment per loan was substantially less than the average 
purchase price for all of the loans11 (Siegel and Stein 2015). 
In addition, Fannie and Freddie pursued claims for their purchases of private-label MBS 
during the housing bubble (Hill 2011/2012, 375-81).  In January 2016, their regulator and 
conservator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), reported that it had settled lawsuits 
against sixteen out of eighteen financial institutions involving the sale of private-label 
instruments to Fannie and Freddie.  Technically, these were not buyback claims insofar as the 
actions alleged securities law violations and sometimes fraud in the sale of the PLS.  But these 
claims were also founded on lax mortgages and their financial effect on originators and issuers 
was similar.  Total settlement amounts equaled $18.2 billion as of year-end 2014 (FHFA 2016b). 
1. Sources of Put-back Claims 
As this discussion of GSE recoveries suggests, each of the three securitization channels 
has generated put-back demands and lawsuits (Standard & Poor’s 2013a).  While these demands 
share many similarities across channels, there are also differences depending on the channel. 
Turning to the private-label channel, many private-label issuances featured long chains of 
transfers involving mortgage brokers, loan originators, correspondent or wholesale lenders, 
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investment banks, depositors, trustees, and investors.  At each link in the securitization chain, 
representations and warranties were often made.  Consequently, put-back demands for any given 
securitization in the PLS channel usually involved not just one but a sequence of repurchase 
requests throughout the chain12 (Hill 2011/2012, 375; Murphy 2012).  Private-label securities 
were especially prone to buyback claims because they experienced higher average default rates 
than GSE RMBS (Fitch 2011). 
As discussed, the GSE channel also generated repurchase claims.  Although the GSEs’ 
issuances performed better on average than their PLS cousins, as noted above, the 
representations and warranties made to Fannie and Freddie were stronger in nature and spawned 
more interpretive case law due to their standardization, making them easier to litigate 
successfully  (Fleming 2013; Strubel 2011). 
Finally, defective FHA-insured loans generated their own set of buyback and statutory 
claims, sometimes by Ginnie Mae and sometimes by the U.S. Department of Justice.   Some of 
those claims became turbocharged due to certifications that the originators had to sign when 
making FHA-insured loans.  Under the FHA’s direct endorsement program, designated lenders 
are allowed to designate mortgages as eligible for FHA insurance.  In order to qualify for this 
program, lenders must provide annual certifications that their quality control systems comport 
with all relevant rules of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)13 
(Goodman 2015).  Lenders must further certify that each FHA-insured loan observes all relevant 
HUD rules14 (id.).  Before 2015, lenders had to make these affirmations regardless of their 
knowledge or their ability to detect violations (id.).   
The Department of Justice has taken the position that any lender who knowingly submits 
loans for FHA mortgage insurance containing material underwriting defects that disqualify those 
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loans for FHA mortgage insurance makes a false claim for purposes of the False Claims Act 
(U.S. Department of Justice 2016).  Under that Act, lenders who knowingly submit false or 
fraudulent claims to the federal government for payment or approval are liable to the government 
for damages.  Justice Department claims under the False Claims Act pose the highest monetary 
exposure of any of these types of claims because violators must pay civil penalties of $5,000 to 
$11,000 per claim plus treble damages.  In 2011, the United States sued all of the top five 
mortgage originators for False Claim Act violations in connection with their certifications for 
FHA insurance15 (Goodman 2015).  According to the Justice Department, the federal 
government recovered over $5 billion in these and other claims for housing and mortgage fraud 
from January 2009 through October 2015 (U.S. Department of Justice 2015).  
In addition, DOJ has also pursued FHA claims under the powerful and flexible civil 
money penalty provisions in Section 951 of the Financial Reform, Recovery and Enforcement 
Act of 1989 (FIRREA) (Standard & Poor’s 2013a).  FIRREA is attractive in many circumstances 
because it has a longer limitations period and lower threshold of proof than the False Claims Act.  
However, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals cast doubt on the viability of this theory when it 
ruled in 2016 that FIRREA precludes recovery for intentional breach of contractual 
representations and warranties through the sale of poor-quality mortgages absent evidence that a 
seller intended to defraud purchasers when the representations and warranties originally were 
made (United States ex rel. Edward O’Donnell 2016). 
2.  Success of Put-back Claims 
As the GSE experience shows, buyback claims have not been invariably successful.  The 
chances of prevailing on claims for breach of representations and warranties vary widely 
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according to the type of breach, the passage of time, the litigation capacity of the plaintiff, and 
the solvency of the defendant.   
To begin with, success may turn on the type of claim.  Some breaches of representations 
and warranties are easily proven because they turn on commonly available evidence using 
objective standards.  Early payment defaults are a good example, because servicing records 
normally show whether the borrower was delinquent in the first three months of the loan.   
Other breaches are harder to substantiate and subject to dispute.  The facts may require 
further investigation into hard-to-obtain documents outside of the purchaser’s possession or the 
representation in question may be couched in vague or subjective language.  Thus, cases alleging 
false loan-to-value ratios or appraised values require reconstructing the actual appraised value at 
origination, which is subject to debate and difficult to do.  Purchasers who assert other types of 
fraud or misrepresentation generally must prove those claims based on evidence from the face of 
the loan or deal documents, which can be daunting (Miller 2014, 300-301).  Buyback disputes 
over loans that supposedly were allowed to depart from underwriting standards due to 
compensating factors can be particularly messy to litigate. 
While it is relatively simple to point to errors in loan documents based on a sample of the 
contested book of business, the import of those errors will be in question.  Were they simple 
errors (such as whether the borrower was self-employed versus a contractual employee) that 
would not or should not be counted against the originator?  Or are a large share of such errors 
indicative of sloppy underwriting that should and does matter to outcomes in conjunction with a 
price decline, even though it is the price decline itself which is a major factor in default and thus 
in losses?   
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In addition, the amount of time that has elapsed since the loan sale affects the deterrent 
role of reps and warranties and the prospects for compensation.  Many Mortgage Loan Purchase 
Agreements predating the crisis contained no hard-and-fast outer time limits on bringing put-
back claims.  Under those contractual provisions, and absent an otherwise binding statute of 
limitations, a purchaser could ostensibly demand repurchase any time upon discovery of a breach 
of a representation until the loan principal was fully repaid (Hartman-Glaser et al. 2014; Miller 
2014, 311; Tate).  This is not a hypothetical concern:  Hartman-Glaser et al. (2014) discovered 
loans from GSE securitizations going back to 1985 that were the subject of repurchase requests 
between 2011 and 2014 (id., 2 n.2).  In too many cases, defects did not surface and repurchase 
claims were not made until those responsible were long gone, eviscerating the deterrent function 
of representations and warranties. 
This timing issue is a double-edged sword for purchasers and sellers.  The more time that 
elapses until a put-back demand is made, the harder it is for the purchaser to prove due to 
dimming memories, missing witnesses, and lost documentation (Miller 2014, 299-300).  At the 
same time, the specter of open-ended contingent liabilities can erode investors’ confidence in a 
bank or other issuer.   For this reason, sellers have aggressively resisted older put-back claims 
based on lack of reasonably prompt notice16 or expiration of statutes of limitations (id.). 
The litigation capacity of the purchaser also affects the likelihood of successful put-back 
claims.  The vigor with which the GSEs pursued buyback demands reflected their ability to 
terminate lenders’ contractual rights to sell agency loans (Hill 2011/2012, 371),17 their greater 
litigation might combined with that of the federal government, plus the mission of Fannie and 
Freddie’s conservator to maximize the assets in the conservatorship estates in many cases.  
Similarly, Ginnie Mae’s ability to pursue claims through civil actions brought by the Justice 
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Department – together with the threat of treble damages under the False Claims Act -- 
substantially enhanced its power to negotiate favorable settlements. 
In contrast, investors found it harder to bring successful put-back claims for private-label 
securities.  One hurdle consists of the fact that representations and warranties for PLS are less 
standardized than those for agency MBS (Fleming 2013; Standard & Poor’s 2013a, 6).  In 
addition, in order to have standing, at least twenty-five percent of an issue’s shares must first 
generally vote to demand that the securitization trustee pursue a put-back claim.  Only if the 
trustee fails to take action within a set period of time may investors directly sue.  Still, investor 
groups have managed to surmount this obstacle (Murphy 2012; Standard & Poor’s 2013a, 6). 
Finally, as noted before, recovery depends on the seller’s continued solvency.  The 
largest banks survived years of repurchase claims bruised but intact (Standard & Poor’s 2013a, 3, 
7-8).  However, other mortgage originators failed due in part to high put-back demands (Barr 
2007; New Century Bankruptcy Court Examiner 2008, 36, 70-72, 105-06, 405-06), leaving some 
of those demands unsatisfied.      
III. Market Responses and Policy Implications 
 
There have been two major market responses to the post-crisis impact of put-backs.  
Citing the need to avoid future put-backs (Lux and Greene 2015, 17, 24), major lenders – 
particularly well-capitalized lenders who have much to lose in the event of future put-back 
claims -- have either withdrawn from government-insured lending or have imposed on 
themselves credit overlays that go beyond the requirements of the GSEs, thereby lowering their 
market share.18   Nonbank lenders have emerged as the major origination channel to fill this gap.  
The shift is dramatic. 
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The problems with these market responses are two-fold. First, the shift to thinly 
capitalized entities implies that, in a future crisis, representation and warranty penalties could not 
be effectively enforced against those entities.  This undermines the compensatory value of reps 
and warranties going forward.  
Second, lenders who believe they are no longer assured of default insurance through FHA 
and the GSEs are imposing credit overlays that go beyond the levels required by FHA and the 
GSEs. These lending constraints go beyond historic levels and beyond the levels historically 
associated with creditworthy lending, with mortgage market and home lending consequences that 
are described below.  
A. The Shift to Thinly Capitalized Entities, Growth of Credit Overlays and 
Consequences 
 
Immediately after the crisis, most home mortgages were originated by the major banks 
that were subject to capital adequacy and repurchase reserve requirements.  More recently, 
however, the market share of mortgage originations by banks and especially the largest banks 
has fallen substantially (see Figure 4).  This void has been filled by more thinly capitalized 
nonbank mortgage originators who are not regulated by prudential banking regulators for 
solvency (Lux and Greene 2015), renewing concerns about the financial capacity of those 
lenders to make good on their representations and warranties.   
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Fig. 4.  Market share by lender type, 1995-2014 
 
Source:  Board of Governors et al. (2016b), 23 & fig. 10b. 
The lack of willingness on the part of established, traditional banks to extend mortgage 
credit has created an opportunity for a new type of market participant: minimally capitalized 
nonbank mortgage lenders.  In view of the recent history of successful repurchase litigation 
against banks, nonbank lenders enjoy a distinct competitive advantage because they lack legacy 
put-back exposure and have scant capital at risk for future repurchase claims.  The growth of 
these institutions (Standard & Poor’s 2014) presents unique systemic risk—as these lenders are 
not subject to traditional capital requirements under prudential bank regulation and are minimally 
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capitalized,19 their failure can be harmful to the market as a whole (FHFA OIG 2014b, 23-24; 
FSOC 2015, 10, 114).  There is no evidence, moreover, that investors are demanding pricing 
differentials based on the capital adequacy of individual sellers (Standard & Poor’s 2013a). 
At the same time, imposition of credit overlays by bank lenders who believe they are no 
longer assured of default insurance through FHA and the GSEs has resulted in a mortgage 
market that is notably constrained. This market constraint may be explained in part from 
regulatory pressures from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and 
Department of Justice (DOJ). Although the primary intent of HUD and DOJ enforcement is 
compliance with HUD rules, it has prompted FHA’s largest bank lenders to announce that they 
significantly reducing their extension of mortgage credit in response (Goodman 2015).  As 
Goodman (2015) states, “lenders have begun to protect themselves the only way available to 
them:  credit overlays, risk-based pricing, or a general pull away from FHA lending.” 
As evidence of the role of buyback requests on mortgage underwriting standards, 
Hartman-Glaser et al. (2014) show that the change in the probability of buyback requests on GSE 
MBS explains tighter mortgage lending standards. Figure 5, taken from Hartman-Glaser et al., 
demonstrates the tightening of standards for FICO scores. 
The housing market has certainly made a recovery since the financial crisis, with housing 
starts having doubled since the recession. However, these heightened constraints on mortgage 
credit continue to suppress demand for housing and homeownership20 (Zandi and Parrott 2014).  
In an analysis of the extent to which constrained credit has affected the mortgage market, Bai et 
al. (2016) found that 5.2 million more loans would have been made between 2009 and 2014 if 
credit standards had been at levels similar to those in 2001. 
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Fig. 5:  Monthly averages and interquartile ranges of the FICO scores for 30-year fixed-
rate mortgages securitized by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from 1999 to 2012. 
 
 
Source: Hartman-Glaser et al. 2014, 1. 
 
 
The tightening of the availability of credit has implications for homeownership.  Acolin 
et al. (2016a) estimate the role of the tightening of credit on the aggregate homeownership rate. 
They find that the homeownership rate in 2010-2013 is predicted to be 5.2 percentage points 
lower than it would be if borrowing constraints were at the 2004-2007 level and 2.3 percentage 
points lower than if the constraints were at the 2001 level, before the relaxation of credit took 
place (Acolin et al. 2016b, 13). 
This tightening in lending standards is part of a cycle in lending.  During the credit 
expansion leading up to 2008, representations and warranties contributed to the overheating of 
the cycle by giving false assurance to investors while failing to deter the race to the bottom in 
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lending standards.  Years later, the protracted enforcement of representations and warranties 
slowed recovery from the crisis by impeding access to mortgages for creditworthy borrowers.  
This history of under-correction during the bubble and over-correction following the collapse is 
the hallmark of procyclicality. 
This procyclicality has micro- and macroprudential repercussions as well as serious 
distributive implications. The after-the-fact use of representations and warranties as a means to 
allocate risk presented solvency threats to individual entities as well as having macro 
repercussions, by increasing systemic risk and slowing recovery.  The distributive implications 
of the unnecessarily tight credit box on low- and moderate-income households and people of 
color persist.    
Accordingly, the goal of reforms to representations and warranties should be to reverse 
the procyclicality that is inherent in the current system.  To achieve this, it will be necessary to 
right-size the enforcement of these provisions while endowing them with deterrent effect.  Doing 
so will enhance financial stability while expanding the credit box in a healthy and sustainable 
way going forward. 
B. Procedural Reforms 
One way to increase the efficacy of representations and warranties is to counter the long 
disconnect between breaches of those representations and enforcement.  In many cases, the 
perpetrators of those breaches were long gone by the time repurchase claims were made.  
Shortening the timespan between the sale of loans and the presentation of put-back claims will 
enhance deterrence while speeding up recovery.  
After the financial crisis, the put-back process was slow to initiate in many cases and 
arduously protracted afterwards, thus prolonging the threat of litigation.  In part, this could be 
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blamed on resistance to put-back claims by sellers.  However, purchasers contributed to the 
drawn-out nature of the proceedings by dragging their feet in presenting claims.  The GSEs, for 
instance, did not close out their repurchase claims on loans originated before 2009 until the end 
of 2013, and only then at the insistence of FHFA’s then Acting Director, Edward DeMarco 
(Goodman et al. 2015, 7). 
The GSEs, FHFA, and other actors eventually instituted a variety of reforms to speed up 
the put-back process.  The GSEs instituted sunset provisions to bring some finality to the put-
back process for performing loans.21  In addition, some court decisions hold that statutes of 
limitation on buyback claims run from the date of sale, not the date of discovery (Miller 2014, 
290, 312), putting the onus on purchasers to make claims more promptly.  
 Another concern is the vague and open-ended nature of some of the representations and 
warranties on which sellers are sued.  In private-label deals, sellers had latitude to renegotiate the 
language of the representations and warranties they agreed to, thus potentially undermining their 
capacity to deter.  Their negotiating ability was substantially less in deals with the GSEs and 
Ginnie Mae.  
 There will always be tension about the advisability of objective representations versus 
ones that are more general and ambiguous.  Sellers want certainty about compliance and the 
extent of their exposure; purchasers worry about losses from negligence, fraud and misconduct 
that they cannot anticipate in advance. A problem, as discussed further below, is that a breach 
may be “minor.”  In the nature of underwriting it may be difficult to avoid such mistakes 
completely.  Then in the aftermath of a crisis, all such mistakes may be grist for put-back claims.  
But how to tell which claims are important and which are not?  While this tension will likely 
?
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It would be also advisable to standardize representations and warranties as much as 
possible in the private-label market.  Doing so would promote the growth of arbitral decisions 
and case law interpreting those standardized terms, which could then provide guidance for faster 
resolution of similar disputes in the future. 
Similarly, it is time to confront the fact that False Claims Act treble damages sanctions 
are overkill in the absence of knowing fraud.  The threat of treble damages is discouraging bank 
lenders from serving the low- and moderate-income community that FHA loans were designed to 
serve.  Instead, penalties for flaws in FHA loans should be tailored to the FHA’s defect 
taxonomy, according to the seriousness of the violation and the violator’s culpability (Goodman 
2015; HUD 2014). 
In an ideal world, the deterrent effect of representations and warranties could also be 
strengthened on the front end to curb the proliferation of lax loans during credit booms while 
obviating the need for enforcement.  Suggested reforms have included improved due diligence 
and internal quality control, stronger data integrity controls for automated underwriting systems, 
faster post-purchase reviews by investors, and improved, standardized disclosures for put-back 
obligations (which the Securities and Exchange Commission issued in 2014 (Dodd Frank Act § 
943; SEC 2014).   
All of these reforms, in place or contemplated, have a potential flaw, however, which is 
that they rely on originators’ compliance. Standardized disclosures and detailed underwriting 
guidelines are only as good as the integrity of the underwriting process that generates them. Even 
if some purchasers carefully monitor loan originations through pre-purchase and post-purchase 
quality assurance and control as suggested, there is the potential for other purchasers to not do 
so, thus undermining the quality of underwriting for the system as a whole.  Those originators 
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and purchasers who skirt requirements and procedures in the “hustle” for business will rapidly 
gain market share at the same time they lower their costs.  The result will be higher prices as 
loans are made that otherwise would not be made and the higher prices will mask the poor 
underwriting. The representations and warranties may stop some but if more aggressive lenders 
operate in this way, there is an “externality” (Wachter 2014) that results as the quality of the 
aggregate mortgage book of business deteriorates and risk increases even for more careful 
lenders.  Moreover those lenders who are willing to undermine standards will set the bar lower 
for other lenders who unless they similarly lower the bar will not be able to attract the marginal 
borrower (Pavlov and Wachter 2006).  And the process is unleashed again. 
C. Systemic Reforms 
Lenders have called for greater clarity in the representations and warranties that they 
provide.  But better drafting alone is not the answer to deterrence.  The events of 2008 showed 
that lenders ignored even objective representations and warranties such as loan-to-value caps in 
the rush for greater market share at the height of the credit bubble.  The market incentives are for 
contractual representations and warranties to be procyclically implemented.  Besides market 
forces that lead to sliding standards across firms, in the aftermath, there will be competitive 
tightening: firms will not want to be the lax lender when they fear that representations and 
warranties will be strictly enforced.  While a normal level of “mistakes” is to be expected and not 
entirely avoidable, such mistakes will become the potential source for put-backs if in the overall 
market, prices have plummeted due to the aftermath of the unsustainable expansion of credit.  
And at that point put-backs bite. Accordingly, stronger external measures are needed in order for 
representations and warranties to have real teeth, to prevent market-wide pressures for 
deterioration in underwriting.  Some of those measures are already in place.   
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Ability-to-repay and qualified mortgage provisions:  The new ability-to-repay and 
qualified mortgage rule promulgated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau places a 
federal floor under underwriting practices by prohibiting reduced documentation loans.  Because 
the rule requires documentation and verification of income and assets, it should significantly 
reduce one of the main sources of put-back claims.  In addition, the rule creates a new category 
of loans with especially risky features such as balloon terms and negative amortization -- called 
non-qualified mortgages – and imposes liability for any such loans made in disregard of the 
borrowers’ ability to repay (CFPB 2013; Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1411-1412).  The rule is enforced 
through federal examinations of lenders and through public and private enforcement mechanisms 
(which apply to poorly underwritten loans and non-qualified mortgages), which should help 
ensure that the federal floor is observed (Dodd-Frank Act §§ 1024(a)(1)(A), 1025-26, 1042(a), 
1413, 1416(b)). 
 Heightened Solvency Safeguards:  Increased solvency supports would give lenders a 
greater stake in observing representations and warranties ex ante in order to avoid liability for 
breach ex post, while providing purchasers with greater assurance of compensation where 
needed.  These supports can take the form of capital requirements, provisioning thresholds and 
mandatory risk retention.    
To begin with, countercyclical provisioning requirements for representations and 
warranties would give representations and warranties more teeth while ensuring that lenders’ 
well of repentance for breach was sufficiently deep.  Currently, insured depository institutions 
maintain reserves against their representation and warranty exposures.  However, the 
computation of those reserves is severely procyclical.  Because institutions compute these 
reserves based on losses already incurred, instead of expected future losses (FASB 2016, 1; 
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Standard & Poor’s 2013a, 6), they chronically under-reserve for representation and warranty 
liability during expansions, while struggling to boost those reserves post-crisis once lawsuits 
spike.   
A shift to the countercyclical technique known as dynamic provisioning would reverse 
this perverse sequence of events.  During credit booms, dynamic provisioning triggers a switch 
in the algorithm for loss reserves that calculates those reserves as if credit was contracting.  
Later, if an economic downturn strikes, that switch is turned off (Caprio 2009, 22; Ren 2011, 11-
19).  This model requires lenders to build up their representations and warranties reserves during 
credit booms, when they have cash, and allows them to spend down those reserves during 
economic downturns to pay for any legal exposures.  To the extent that these added reserves 
made representations and warranties more effective, any resulting legal liability would be 
reduced.24   
While federal regulators have not adopted dynamic provisioning, U.S. accounting 
standards have made strides toward countercyclical provisioning.  In 2016, the Financial 
Standards Accounting Board adopted a new standard requiring lenders to calculate their loan loss 
allowances based on expected credit losses, regardless whether losses have probably been 
incurred (FASB 2016, 1-2; see Board of Governors et al. 2016a).  The provision, which takes 
effect in 2019, requires lenders to book all projected losses over the lifetime of the loans 
immediately upon origination.  This is not a fully countercyclical approach because some losses 
for long-term residential mortgages may not become expected until years down the road.  
Nevertheless, the new provision will require lenders to incorporate forecasts of future conditions 
in addition to past and current events and record projected losses up front.  Importantly, the new 
FASB provision applies to all bank and nonbank lenders alike. 
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Minimum capital requirements form another important solvency safeguard.  Under Basel 
III, prudential banking regulators substantially increased the capital adequacy requirements for 
residential mortgages originated and securitized by federally insured depository institutions.25  In 
addition, Basel III imposes a countercyclical capital buffer designed to kick in when credit 
conditions start to overheat (Department of the Treasury et al. 2013, 62031, 62171).  While 
questions surround the implementation and efficacy of the countercyclical capital buffer if left to 
regulators’ discretion (McCoy 2015, 1204-05 & n.118), Basel III takes a step in the right 
direction by increasing the deterrence exerted by representations and warranties during incipient 
credit bubbles.   
In the capital arena, however, regulatory arbitrage remains a serious concern.  Federal 
banking regulators lack jurisdiction to impose minimum capital requirements on independent 
nonbank lenders (Board of Governors et al. 2016b, 37).26  Even if they did have jurisdiction, 
uniform capital standards would be highly unlikely, given federal regulators’ conclusion that 
Basel III is incompatible with the business models of some large nonbank mortgage servicers 
(id., 37-39).  This means that as the nonbank sector grows, it will continue to enjoy arbitrage 
opportunities and escape the disciplining effect of uniform  capital requirements.  Not only will 
this reduce the in terrorem effect of representations and warranties, it will perpetuate competitive 
inequalities among bank and nonbank lenders.   Unless Congress empowers federal banking 
regulators to impose capital adequacy requirements on mortgage lenders regardless of charter, it 
will be incumbent on the GSEs, Ginnie Mae, and the private-label sector to demand more 
meaningful safeguards from nonbank originators than they have so far.27  Whether these 
investors will impose sufficient capital requirements during a credit boom, when nonbank 
originators are likely to expand and investors are prone to over-optimism, is questionable.  
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Moreover if investors and private label securitizers themselves, in a bid to grow market share, 
fail to demand comparable safeguards from nonbank originators, the game will be on again.  We 
can already see potential warning signs of trouble in the rising numbers of FHA mortgages being 
made by nonbank lenders to borrowers with FICO scores below 660.  (Lux and Greene 2015, 18-
25). 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
During the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, representations and warranties (contractual 
statements enforceable through legal action) on lending processes may have given investors false 
assurance that mortgage loans were being properly underwritten.  This assurance in turn may 
have contributed to overinvestment in MBS in two ways.  First, the assumption that legally 
enforceable penalties associated with reps and warranties would deter lax underwriting may have 
led to less screening of loans than would otherwise have occurred.  In turn, the failure to oversee 
actual underwriting practices enabled the spread of lax lending practices.  The existence of these 
reps and warranties and the potential penalties associated with them did not deter lax 
underwriting.  Paradoxically, after the fact when the reps and warranties were enforced, this 
enforcement coincided with a tightening of credit beyond historic norms, with serious 
distributive implications. Post-crisis, lenders’ fears over put-back exposure appear to have 
caused them to scale back, particularly on government lending to creditworthy borrowers.  The 
reps and warranties as used in mortgage lending in the run-up to the crisis were part of the 
procyclicality of lending, both in the easing and tightening phases of the lending cycle.  
We suggest reforms to add to the deterrent value of reps and warranties.  Particularly we 
suggest a shift to the countercyclical technique known as dynamic provisioning to increase the in 
terrorem effect of representations and warranties.  This model requires lenders to build up their 
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representations and warranties reserves during credit booms, when they have cash and when risk 
is growing, and allows them to spend down those reserves during economic downturns to pay for 
any legal exposures.  To the extent that these added reserves signaled greater risk they would 
make self-enforcement of representations and warranties more effective and procyclicality would 
be reduced.  We also propose stricter capital standards. 
Nonetheless such changes would be useless unless they were adopted throughout the 
lending industry: otherwise, just those entities with risky practices would increase their market 
share.  And next time such entities are more likely to be thinly capitalized, as the lesson of 
capital exposure to legal risk has been learned, thus further reducing the deterrence effect of reps 
and warranties, going forward.    
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6
  For discussion of principal-agent problems in securitization, see, e.g., Keys et al. 2010 and Mian and Sufi 
2014. 
7  Despite this attempt to limit claims against sellers for defective loans, transferees have sued on a wide 
variety of claims for damages, rescission of entire loan pools, and other types of relief (Murphy 2012). 
8  Alternatively, the purchaser at its option may allow the seller to replace the defective mortgage loan with 
another mortgage loan (see, e.g., Master Loan Purchase Agreement 2005, § 6). 
9  169 mortgage lenders, most of which were independent nonbank originators, failed in 2007.  Avery et al. 
2008, A109-10. 
10  An early example was the subprime lender Ownit Mortgage Solutions, which failed in December 2006 
after it was overwhelmed by mortgage repurchase requests (Reckard 2006).   
11  Standard & Poor’s reported in 2013 that based on settlements publicly disclosed by FHFA at the time, it 
“seem[ed] that the settlement amount was 12%-14% of the original unpaid principal balance of securities” (Standard 
& Poor’s 2013a, 7).  Professor Julie Hill (2011/2012, 347) criticized the repurchase decisions of the GSEs and 
FHFA as opaque and not always based on the merits of claims for breach, stating: 
  
 
 
45 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 [I]n some instances the government allowed the Enterprises to absorb losses even when the losses 
could be transferred to large banks.  Presumably this is part of the government’s larger efforts to stabilize 
systemically important banks.  On the other hand, the government allowed the Enterprises to transfer some 
losses to small banks, even when the losses ultimately resulted in bank failures.  The FHFA has likely 
allowed risk shifting to small banks in part because it determined that even if some small banks fail, the 
economic impact will not be widespread. 
12  Financial guaranty insurers also lodged claims against insureds for compensation of insurance proceeds 
paid to investors to cover claims for breach of representations and warranties on the underlying PLS (Murphy 2012). 
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16  Some private-label Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreements – although not all – require reasonably prompt 
notice as a condition of repurchase. 
17  In 2012, following a dispute over its put-back requests, Fannie Mae announced that it would place 
restrictions on loan sales by Bank of America (Hill 2011/2012, 374). 
18  The private label market is moribund, thus effectively the GSEs and Ginnie Mae are the securitization 
market. 
19  Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae now require nonbank sellers/servicers to maintain minimum 
capital ratios of 6% “or their equivalent,” measured by tangible net worth to total assets (Fannie Mae 2016; Freddie 
Mac 2015; Ginnie Mae 2014).  These capital thresholds are not risk-based and in many cases, will be substantially 
lower than the minimum capital expected of insured banks (Kaul and Goodman 2016) 
In addition, some have attributed Basel III’s tighter capital treatment of mortgage servicing assets (MSAs) 
to the steady recent migration of mortgage servicing rights from banks to nonbanks (Mortgage Bankers Association 
2016), although federal regulators have cast doubt on that assertion (Board of Governors et al. 2016b, 28, 35).  Basel 
III increased the risk weights for MSAs from 100 percent to 250 percent and also limited the percentage of the 
common equity element of tier one capital that can be comprised of MSAs to ten percent (id., 17-18).  These Basel 
III requirements apply to banks but not nonbanks.  Id. 
20  See Dulaney et al. 2016 (“Partly as a result [of False Claim Act claims], over the past couple years some 
major banks, such as J.P. Morgan and Bank America, have pulled back sharply from the FHA program by imposing 
their own more stringent requirements on FHA loans, a move that make it harder for less-credit-worthy borrowers to 
get a mortgage.  Wells Fargo, which is still one of the most prominent FHA lenders, last year said it would raise the 
minimum credit score it accepts on certain FHA loans to 640 from 600, reversing a 2014 decision to reduce the 
required score”). 
21  In 2012, the GSEs announced that loans with thirty-six months of consecutive timely payments (or twelve 
months in the case of HARP loans) would thereafter be immune from repurchase exposure.  These sunset provisions 
only applied to loans sold or delivered on or after January 1, 2013 (Fannie Mae 2012; Freddie Mac 2012; Goodman 
et al. 2015, 2). 
 In May 2014, FHFA Director Mel Watt relaxed these sunset requirements to permit loans with no more 
than two 30-day delinquencies and no 60-day delinquencies during the 36- or 12-month period to qualify for the 
sunset (FHFA OIG 2014a, 15-17; Goodman et al. 2015, 3).   
24  For a review of the literature analyzing the adoption of dynamic provisioning in other countries, see McCoy 
2015 at 1207. 
25  Under the standardized approach, residential mortgages that do not meet specific quality standards or that 
are non-performing have risk-weights of 100% (Department of the Treasury et al. 2013, 62180-82, 62190-91, 
62196-97).  In addition, federal banking regulators now require higher capital charges against residential mortgages 
that are securitized by banks (id., 62116, 62119, 62121, 62194-96, 62253).  
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26  In contrast, Dodd-Frank’s risk retention provisions do apply to non-qualified mortgages made by 
independent nonbank originators.  
27  See note 19 supra.  Two leading analysts recently concluded that the GSEs’ and Ginnie Mae’s new capital 
requirements for nonbank mortgage servicers were “inadequate” (Kaul and Goodman 2016). 
